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stine,6 where the Court of Appeals held: "Defendant's agreement
without reservation to arbitrate in London according to the English
statute necessarily implied a submission to the procedure whereby that
law is there enforced. Otherwise the inference must be drawn that
they never intended to abide by their pledge. They contracted that
the machinery by which their arbitration might proceed would be
foreign machinery operating from the foreign court." Gilbert v.
Burnstine is similar to the instant case in that the defendant did not
participate in the arbitration and was served without the territorial
jurisdiction of the court. It differs in that the defendant agreed to be
found by arbitration in London pursuant to the arbitration law of
Great Britain. Whereas in the instant case the appellant agreed that
judgment could be entered on an award in accordance with the prac-
tice of any court having jurisdiction.
The meaning of the latter clause is the real question involved in
this case. If it means, as appellant contended, that a New York court
could enter judgment against it only if that court could obtain per-
sonal jurisdiction after the 'arbitration award was made, then the
judgment must be vacated. However, such a construction at its
very best is extremely narrow and strained, and the clause, if such a
construction were intended, might just as well have been omitted from
the contract. It seems more logical to assume that the words had
meaning and significance, and that the parties intended that if an
award was made, the proper New York court would have jurisdiction
by consent, and judgment could be entered thereon by such court.
To hold otherwise frustrates the only purpose the clause could serve.
I.K.
LABoR-FAIR LABOR STANDARDS AcT-OvERTIME COMPENSA-
TION-BONUSEs REGULARLY PAID.-Defendant, engaged in the manu-
facture of building construction materials, employs some 65 employees
who are admittedly covered by the Fair Labor Standards Act.1 In
April, 1942, defendant's board of directors adopted a resolution pro-
viding that, commencing in June, 1942, all of the company's employees,
with the exception of certain finishers, should be paid a monthly bonus,
in war stamps, of 10% of their weekly base salaries for the previous
month. The finishers were placed on an incentive bonus plan. For
some two and one-half years, the bonuses were received by the em-
ployees. The employer was not legally obligated to pay such bonus,
and the employees knew that it was not contractual and that it could
be discontinued had the company's finances so dictated. The defen-
dant company always considered the bonus payments as wages for
purposes of computing social security, unemployment insurance, with-
6 255 N. Y. 348, 174 N. E. 706 (1931).
152 STAT. 1060, 29 U. S. C. A. §§201-219 (1938).
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holding and victory tax and in determining the firm's premiums on
workman's compensation insurance policies. All of the firm's em-
ployees received base weekly salaries covering the first 40 hours of
work in the workweek. When an employee worked in excess of the
40 hours per week, his base weekly salary was divided by 40, and he
was paid one and one-half the resultant rate for each hour in excess
of 40. Bonus payments were not included in computing an em-
ployee's regular rate of pay. Suit was instituted by the Administra-
tor of the Wage and Hour Division of the Department of Labor, to
enjoin the defendant from violating Section 7 of the Fair Labor Stand-
ards Act,2 said violation arising from the failure of defendant to
include the bonus as part of the base weekly earnings upon which
overtime premiums were computed. The District Court found for
the plaintiff, and defendant appealed. Held, affirmed. Walling v.
Richmond Screw Anchor Co., - F. (2d) - (1946).
The District Court, in holding that such bonus should be included
as part of the base for the purpose of computing overtime premiums,
answered defendant's contentions that such bonus was a mere gift or
gratuity, and that there was no binding obligation to pay the bonus,
by pointing to the fact that such bonus was part of the employee's
regular and actual compensation, and that for some two and one-half
years the employees had been credited with it regardless of how much
or how little they produced. The sensible test, the court held, is not
what the employer was legally bound to pay, but what regularly and
actually reached the employee. To hold otherwise, would be to allow
an employer to defeat the purposes of the Act. An employer could
compensate his employees at any rate satisfactory to them (in this
case, regular salary plus bonus) and at the same time, make overtime
cheaper for himself by basing it on a weekly pay smaller than what is
actually and regularly received.
In its holding, the court gave appropriate weight to a published
interpretative statement of the Administrator of the Wage and Hour
Division. This memorandum divided bonus plans into two cate-
gories: a bonus plan pursuant to which the employer pays a bonus
solely at his own discretion, without having previously promised,
agreed or arranged to pay such bonus, e.g., a bonus based on a share
of the profits, or a lump sum at Christmas time; and a bonus plan
2 52 STAT. 1063, 29 U. S. C. A. § 207.
"Maximum Hours(a) No employer shall, except as otherwise provided in this section,
employ any of his employees who is engaged in commerce or in
the production of goods for commerce ...(3) for a workweek longer than forty hours unless such
employee receives compensation for his employment in
excess of the hours above specified at a rate not less
than one and one-half times the regular rate at which
he is employed."
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under which the employer promises, agrees or arranges to pay an
amount ascertainable by the application of a formula, e.g., production
bonus, or bonus paid to employee when certain types of merchandise
are sold. The Administrator set forth in the memorandum that
bonuses which fell into the latter category should be included in the
computation of the regular rate. Speaking for the court, Judge Frank
ruled that the bonus in this case fell into the latter category and should
therefore be counted as a part of the "regular wage".
Turning to the Supreme Court decisions for a determination of
what constitutes regular wages, the court relied on three cases: Wal-
ling v. Helmerich & Payne, In.,8 Walling v. Youngerinan-Reynolds
Hardwood Co.4 and Walling v. Harnischfeger Corp.5 In the first of
these, the employer, after the passage of the Fair Labor Standards
Act, signed a contract with its employees whereby the split-day or
"Poxon" plan was adopted, which provided for splitting the regular
eight-hour day worked previous to the Act into two four-hour shifts
and paying overtime on the last four hours. The rate thus set for
overtime was lower than the rate which would have resulted from a
division of the weekly wage by the number of hours worked. The
court there said, "While the words 'regular rate' are not defined in
the Act, they obviously mean the hourly rate actually paid for the
normal, non-overtime workweek." 6 The court further held in this
case that the freedom to contract does not include the right to com-
pute the regular rate in a wholly unrealistic and artificial manner so
as to negate the statutory purpose.
In Walling v. Youngerman-Reynolds, piece-rate workers, prior
to the enactment of the Act, had been receiving approximately fifty-
nine cents per hour. Under a new contract their straight time rate
was set at thirty-five cents per hour, 'which, the court held, was "com-
pletely unrelated to the payments actually and normally received each
week by the employees." 7 The third case, Walling v. Harnischfeger,
presents a case similar in many respects to the present one, since it
involved the part which bonuses play in computing the regular rate.
The distinguishing feature, as indicated above, is that in the present
case the company was not legally bound to pay, while in the Harnisch-
feger case the bonus was part of the contract of employment. Sig-
nificant in the light of the present decision is the court's statement
that "When employees do earn more than the basic hourly rates
because of the operation of the incentive bonus plan, the basis rates
lose their significance in determining the actual rate of compensation." 8
3323 U. S. 37, 89 L. ed. 29 (1944).
4325 U. S. 419, 89 L. ed. 1705 (1945).
5 325 U. S. 427, 89 L. ed. 1711 11945).
a Walling v. Helmerich & Payne, Inc., 323 U. S. 37, 40, 89 L. ed. 29, 33
(1944).
7 Walling v. Youngerman-Reynolds Hardwood" Co., 325 U. S. 419, 89 L. ed.
1705 (1945).
8 Walling v. Harnischfeger Corp., 325 U. S. 427, 89 L. ed. 1711 (1945).
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As stated by the Supreme Court in an earlier decision,9 the Con-
gressional intent in enacting the legislation was to foster the distribu-
tion of employment opportunities among a greater number of indi-
viduals by making it costly for employers to work employees beyond
40 hours in any one week. The present decision supports this intent
and the firm stand which the courts have taken on overtime practices
has been retained. This policy will undoubtedly prove important in
the employment picture of the post-reconversion period.
E. M. F.
MASTER AND SERVANT-SOLICITING FORMER EMPLOYER'S CUS-
TOMERS.-Plaintiff sued to recover percentage of the profits allegedly
due him under a contract of employment to manage defendant's de-
partment store. He admitted that he was paid a salary but stated
that he had not received any of the percentage of the profits due him.
Defendant denied plaintiff's claim for a percentage of the profits and
set up several counterclaims. In the first counterclaim the defendant
asserted that plaintiff had obtained names of defendant's customers
during his period of employment and had solicited trade from them in
competition with his master for a company in which the plaintiff held
a financial interest. This counterclaim stated that by reason of such
misconduct, the plaintiff forfeited his right to retain the weekly wages
he received for his employment, which wages totalled $10,065. The
second counterclaim sought an injunction to prevent plaintiff from
using the information which he had obtained in the course of his
former employment. Plaintiff made a motion to dismiss defendant's
counterclaims as insufficient in law. The Supreme Court, New York
County, denied plaintiff's motion to dismiss and he appealed to the
Appellate Division, First Department. Held, order of Supreme Court
modified by striking out the counterclaims. Kleinfeld v. Roburn
Agewcies, -, App. Div. -, 60 N. Y. S. (2d) 485 (1st Dep't 1946).
As to the first counterclaim that, because of his misconduct,
plaintiff had forfeited the weekly wages he had received, defendant
did not assert that there was any special agreement on which he based
his claim for recovery of the wages already paid. The mere relation-
ship of master and servant is not enough to constitute the servant as
a fiduciary accountable for the wages he has received.' In the ab-"
sence of a special agreement rendering the employee liable for wages
received, an employer cannot recover back such wages or equivalent
drawings paid during a period of completed employment. 2 It would
9 Overnight Motor Transportation Co., Inc. v. Missel, 316 U. S. 572, 86
L/ed. 1682 (1942).
1 American Stay Co. v. Delaney, 211 Mass. 229, 97 N. E. 911 (1912).
2 Pease Piano Co. v. Taylor, 197 App. Div. 468, 189 N. Y. Supp. 425 (1st
Dep't 1921).
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